Classical integer factorization

Classical polynomial-time question remains openEvidence checked

Subjects: Algorithms and data structures

Collections: Limits of computation · Cryptography

Reading depth

The problem

Start with 77. Multiplying 7 by 11 gives 77, and multiplying them again checks the answer. Factoring reverses that operation: given only 77, find its prime building blocks, 7 and 11. A prime is a whole number greater than 1 divisible only by 1 and itself. For much larger numbers, that search can require enormous work. The question is whether an ordinary classical computer can find every prime factor with a reliable efficiency guarantee as the number of written digits grows.[1]

RSA names and input sizes A linear input-length comparison from zero to 4096 bits. Three selected factored challenge integers are RSA-250, 250 decimal digits and 829 bits; RSA-260, 260 decimal digits and 862 bits; and RSA-896, 270 decimal digits and 896 bits. Filled bars show those selected completed factorizations. Outlined bars at 2048 and 4096 bits are size references only, without a particular integer or factoring status. 4096 is not an original numbered RSA challenge. Bar length does not represent difficulty, runtime, security strength or a percentage solved. RSA names and input sizes Three selected factorizations. RSA names mix decimal digits and bits. Selected factored challenges Size references only 0 1024 2048 3072 4096 RSA-250 829 bits 250 decimal digits RSA-260 862 bits 260 decimal digits RSA-896 896 bits 270 decimal digits 2048-bit modulus 2048 bits 4096-bit modulus 4096 bits Input length (bits) Bars show input length, not difficulty, runtime or a percentage solved. 4096 bits is a reference size, not an original numbered RSA challenge. RSA names and input sizes A linear input-length comparison from zero to 4096 bits. Three selected factored challenge integers are RSA-250, 250 decimal digits and 829 bits; RSA-260, 260 decimal digits and 862 bits; and RSA-896, 270 decimal digits and 896 bits. Filled bars show those selected completed factorizations. Outlined bars at 2048 and 4096 bits are size references only, without a particular integer or factoring status. 4096 is not an original numbered RSA challenge. Bar length does not represent difficulty, runtime, security strength or a percentage solved. RSA names and input sizes Three selected factorizations. RSA names mix decimal digits and bits. Selected factored challenges Size references only 0 2048 4096 RSA-250 829 bits 250 decimal digits RSA-260 862 bits 260 decimal digits RSA-896 896 bits 270 decimal digits 2048-bit modulus 2048 bits 4096-bit modulus 4096 bits Input length (bits) Bars show input length, not difficulty. 4096 bits is a reference size, not an original numbered RSA challenge.

Explore the factoring milestones ↓

Scope

Worst-case polynomial-time classical factoring of arbitrary positive integers, with input size measured by the number of bits. Deterministic and bounded-error randomized algorithms are both in scope; quantum algorithms and isolated factorizations are separate results.

What remains open

Researchers can factor many numbers and have completed remarkable individual calculations. RSA-250 was announced factored in 2020; RSA-260 and RSA-896 have published factors from September 2026. Each is a solved numerical example. The open question asks for one classical method with an efficiency guarantee covering every input, however long. Shor’s algorithm supplies a quantum answer, using a different kind of computation.[1] [3] [4] [5]

Why it matters

An easy check does not automatically give an easy way to find an answer. Factoring makes that gap tangible and helps us compare classical and quantum computers. It also matters for RSA: finding a key’s prime factors allows recovery of its private operation. RSA can fail through other attacks too, so a factoring milestone describes one route through a larger cryptographic subject.[1] [6] [7]

RSA milestones

RSA-250
Fabrice Boudot, Pierrick Gaudry, Aurore Guillevic, Nadia Heninger, Emmanuel Thomé and Paul Zimmermann

RSA-250 was factored using CADO-NFS. Scope: One fixed 250-decimal-digit, 829-bit challenge modulus.

The date is the announcement date. This solves one instance and gives no polynomial-time guarantee for arbitrary inputs.

Source date: 2020-02-28The primary announcement prints both factors; exact multiplication reproduces the historical challenge integer.Read the source ↗Link to this milestone
RSA-260
Eric Lu

RSA-260 was factored with a GPU implementation of the general number field sieve. Scope: One fixed 260-decimal-digit, 862-bit challenge modulus.

The source date is publication, not completion. Implementation improvements do not establish general classical polynomial-time factoring; no current-record ranking is claimed.

Source date: 2026-09-09Both factors multiply to the historical modulus. The report records completion at 2026-09-03 01:48:57 UTC, which is 2026-09-02 18:48:57 Pacific.Read the source ↗Link to this milestone
RSA-896
Stephen A. Weis

RSA-896 was reported factored on 19 September 2026 with GPU CADO-NFS. Scope: One fixed 896-bit, 270-decimal-digit challenge modulus, distinct from RSA-270.

The source supplies no exact publication day, completion clock or timezone. This completed instance does not give a worst-case polynomial-time bound or settle all RSA attacks.

The printed factors multiply exactly to the historical RSA-896 integer. The page header says September 2026 and its text identifies 19 September as the factorization date.Read the source ↗Link to this milestone

Definitions

3 terms
polynomial time

A running-time bound by a fixed power of the input length. Here the length is the number of binary digits, so a bound by a power of the integer itself would be a different, much larger guarantee.[1]

greatest common divisor

The largest positive integer dividing both given integers. For example, 7 is the greatest common divisor of 7 and 77; 11 is the greatest common divisor of 33 and 77.[1] [9]

multiplicative order

The least positive rr for which ara^r leaves remainder one modulo NN, when aa and NN have no common factor. A suitable even order can yield factors through greatest-common-divisor calculations; some choices fail.[1]

Sources

  1. Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer Peter W. Shor · 1995-08-30
    Notes on Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer

    Selected passages of the January 25, 1996 version-2 preprint were freshly read, including input-length complexity and the order-finding reduction. The retained date is the first submission, August 30, 1995. The guarantee is quantum; no complete algorithm implementation or proof audit is claimed.

  2. Dynamic Scaling Pollard’s P-1 Algorithm Wenwen Xia, Geng Wang and Dawu Gu · 2026-08-13
    Notes on Dynamic Scaling Pollard’s P-1 Algorithm

    Fresh indexed publisher passages give the August 13, 2026 publication date, smooth P−1 condition and deliberately constructed 1024-bit test inputs. Direct HTML/PDF retries failed, including a 429 response, so a fresh complete-PDF read is not claimed. These restricted experiments are not a general polynomial guarantee.

  3. Factorization of RSA-250 Fabrice Boudot, Pierrick Gaudry, Aurore Guillevic, Nadia Heninger, Emmanuel Thomé and Paul Zimmermann · 2020-02-28
    Notes on Factorization of RSA-250

    Fresh primary announcement of February 28, 2020 states the factors and CADO-NFS method. Exact multiplication, 250 digits and 829 bits independently rechecked. The announcement does not supply a completion clock or timezone; no current-record ranking is claimed.

  4. Factoring RSA-260 Eric Lu · 2026-09-09
    Notes on Factoring RSA-260

    Fresh report confirms publication September 9, 2026, both factors and GPU GNFS method. Exact product, 260 digits and 862 bits rechecked. Completion is September 3 UTC, September 2 Pacific. No record ranking, cost estimate or key-size security recommendation is adopted.

  5. RSA-896 Stephen A. Weis
    Notes on RSA-896

    Fresh author report has a September 2026 header and states factorization on September 19. Printed factors, exact product, 270 digits and 896 bits rechecked. No exact publication day, completion clock or timezone is supplied or inferred; no general algorithm or security forecast follows.

  6. A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman
    Notes on A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems

    Fresh selected passages in the author-hosted original RSA paper explain factor-to-private-exponent recovery and distinguish full RSA inversion questions. Historical performance/security recommendations are not used as current advice; no exact publication day is inferred from this PDF.

  7. PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 Kathleen Moriarty, Burt Kaliski, Jakob Jonsson and Andreas Rusch
    Notes on PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2

    Fresh RFC 8017 key definitions and selected error-condition passages distinguish mathematical private operations from protocol attacks. Its month-level date is not converted to an invented publication day; no deployment recommendation is made.

  8. Forging 1024-bit RSA signatures in nearly SNFS time Laura Shea, Miro Haller, Adam Suhl, Nadia Heninger and Emmanuel Thomé · 2026-09-22
    Notes on Forging 1024-bit RSA signatures in nearly SNFS time

    Fresh preprint header, abstract and selected complexity passages distinguish temporary raw signing-oracle access from factoring. The archive approved it September 22, 2026 after receipt September 20 (also the PDF date). No larger-key extrapolation or complete attack replication is adopted.

  9. A Tale of Two Sieves Carl Pomerance
    Notes on A Tale of Two Sieves

    Fresh selected passages in the author-hosted Notices article explain square congruences, greatest-common-divisor extraction and the heuristic number-field-sieve estimate. The author publication list and PDF give December 1996, volume 43, pages 1473–1485; no exact publication day is supplied. Historical records and asymptotic championship claims are not imported as current facts. No full proof or software replication.

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