The problem
Start with 77. Multiplying 7 by 11 gives 77, and multiplying them again checks the answer. Factoring reverses that operation: given only 77, find its prime building blocks, 7 and 11. A prime is a whole number greater than 1 divisible only by 1 and itself. For much larger numbers, that search can require enormous work. The question is whether an ordinary classical computer can find every prime factor with a reliable efficiency guarantee as the number of written digits grows.[1]
Multiplication builds a number from its prime factors; factoring must find those building blocks from the number alone. For example, 77 gives 7 and 11. Can a classical method do this efficiently for every input, including repetitions of a prime factor?
The input length is its number of binary digits. For , write . The target is an algorithm returning , with distinct primes and positive integer exponents , within classical bit operations for fixed constants ; has an empty product. This is polynomial time: a fixed power of the written length, rather than of the number's value.
The deterministic and bounded-error randomized versions remain unresolved. A randomized method may use random choices; the chosen target requires success probability at least on each input and a polynomial time bound on every run. Repetition can increase that probability, but cannot replace the required time bound.[1] [2]
Explore the factoring milestones ↓
Scope
Worst-case polynomial-time classical factoring of arbitrary positive integers, with input size measured by the number of bits. Deterministic and bounded-error randomized algorithms are both in scope; quantum algorithms and isolated factorizations are separate results.
What remains open
Researchers can factor many numbers and have completed remarkable individual calculations. RSA-250 was announced factored in 2020; RSA-260 and RSA-896 have published factors from September 2026. Each is a solved numerical example. The open question asks for one classical method with an efficiency guarantee covering every input, however long. Shor’s algorithm supplies a quantum answer, using a different kind of computation.[1] [3] [4] [5]
A common factoring strategy seeks two different squares with the same remainder. For example, and both leave remainder 15 when divided by 77. The greatest common divisor is the largest positive integer dividing both its arguments; here
The general number field sieve collects arithmetic relations that can produce such congruences, but not every congruence yields a nontrivial factor. Its usual heuristic running-time estimate has the form , for a positive constant , apart from lower-order terms. As grows, this exceeds every fixed power of .
Pollard's method instead benefits when a prime factor has built from small prime factors. Neither mechanism supplies the required general classical bound; failing to find one also does not prove that none exists.[1] [2] [4] [8] [9]
Why it matters
An easy check does not automatically give an easy way to find an answer. Factoring makes that gap tangible and helps us compare classical and quantum computers. It also matters for RSA: finding a key’s prime factors allows recovery of its private operation. RSA can fail through other attacks too, so a factoring milestone describes one route through a larger cryptographic subject.[1] [6] [7]
For a two-prime RSA modulus , the factors reveal . This lets the private exponent be computed as an inverse of the public exponent modulo : their product leaves remainder one. Factoring is therefore sufficient to recover the RSA private operation. It does not establish an equivalence between factoring and all RSA inversion or protocol attacks.
Shor takes another route: a quantum procedure finds a multiplicative order, the first positive exponent returning a chosen number to remainder one. Classical greatest-common-divisor calculations can turn a suitable order into factors. The contrast asks whether changing computational resources enables a task that every classical method must find expensive. The quantum algorithm is known, but the classical efficiency question remains open; an unconditional lower bound would have to rule out all algorithms in that chosen model.[1] [6] [7] [8]
RSA milestones
RSA-250
RSA-250 was factored using CADO-NFS. Scope: One fixed 250-decimal-digit, 829-bit challenge modulus.
The date is the announcement date. This solves one instance and gives no polynomial-time guarantee for arbitrary inputs.
Source date: 2020-02-28The primary announcement prints both factors; exact multiplication reproduces the historical challenge integer.Read the source ↗Link to this milestoneRSA-260
RSA-260 was factored with a GPU implementation of the general number field sieve. Scope: One fixed 260-decimal-digit, 862-bit challenge modulus.
The source date is publication, not completion. Implementation improvements do not establish general classical polynomial-time factoring; no current-record ranking is claimed.
Source date: 2026-09-09Both factors multiply to the historical modulus. The report records completion at 2026-09-03 01:48:57 UTC, which is 2026-09-02 18:48:57 Pacific.Read the source ↗Link to this milestoneRSA-896
RSA-896 was reported factored on 19 September 2026 with GPU CADO-NFS. Scope: One fixed 896-bit, 270-decimal-digit challenge modulus, distinct from RSA-270.
The source supplies no exact publication day, completion clock or timezone. This completed instance does not give a worst-case polynomial-time bound or settle all RSA attacks.
The printed factors multiply exactly to the historical RSA-896 integer. The page header says September 2026 and its text identifies 19 September as the factorization date.Read the source ↗Link to this milestoneDefinitions
3 terms
polynomial time
A running-time bound by a fixed power of the input length. Here the length is the number of binary digits, so a bound by a power of the integer itself would be a different, much larger guarantee.[1]
greatest common divisor
The largest positive integer dividing both given integers. For example, 7 is the greatest common divisor of 7 and 77; 11 is the greatest common divisor of 33 and 77.[1] [9]
multiplicative order
The least positive for which leaves remainder one modulo , when and have no common factor. A suitable even order can yield factors through greatest-common-divisor calculations; some choices fail.[1]
Sources
- Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer
Notes on Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer
Selected passages of the January 25, 1996 version-2 preprint were freshly read, including input-length complexity and the order-finding reduction. The retained date is the first submission, August 30, 1995. The guarantee is quantum; no complete algorithm implementation or proof audit is claimed.
- Dynamic Scaling Pollard’s P-1 Algorithm
Notes on Dynamic Scaling Pollard’s P-1 Algorithm
Fresh indexed publisher passages give the August 13, 2026 publication date, smooth P−1 condition and deliberately constructed 1024-bit test inputs. Direct HTML/PDF retries failed, including a 429 response, so a fresh complete-PDF read is not claimed. These restricted experiments are not a general polynomial guarantee.
- Factorization of RSA-250
Notes on Factorization of RSA-250
Fresh primary announcement of February 28, 2020 states the factors and CADO-NFS method. Exact multiplication, 250 digits and 829 bits independently rechecked. The announcement does not supply a completion clock or timezone; no current-record ranking is claimed.
- Factoring RSA-260
Notes on Factoring RSA-260
Fresh report confirms publication September 9, 2026, both factors and GPU GNFS method. Exact product, 260 digits and 862 bits rechecked. Completion is September 3 UTC, September 2 Pacific. No record ranking, cost estimate or key-size security recommendation is adopted.
- RSA-896
Notes on RSA-896
Fresh author report has a September 2026 header and states factorization on September 19. Printed factors, exact product, 270 digits and 896 bits rechecked. No exact publication day, completion clock or timezone is supplied or inferred; no general algorithm or security forecast follows.
- A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems
Notes on A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems
Fresh selected passages in the author-hosted original RSA paper explain factor-to-private-exponent recovery and distinguish full RSA inversion questions. Historical performance/security recommendations are not used as current advice; no exact publication day is inferred from this PDF.
- PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2
Notes on PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2
Fresh RFC 8017 key definitions and selected error-condition passages distinguish mathematical private operations from protocol attacks. Its month-level date is not converted to an invented publication day; no deployment recommendation is made.
- Forging 1024-bit RSA signatures in nearly SNFS time
Notes on Forging 1024-bit RSA signatures in nearly SNFS time
Fresh preprint header, abstract and selected complexity passages distinguish temporary raw signing-oracle access from factoring. The archive approved it September 22, 2026 after receipt September 20 (also the PDF date). No larger-key extrapolation or complete attack replication is adopted.
- A Tale of Two Sieves
Notes on A Tale of Two Sieves
Fresh selected passages in the author-hosted Notices article explain square congruences, greatest-common-divisor extraction and the heuristic number-field-sieve estimate. The author publication list and PDF give December 1996, volume 43, pages 1473–1485; no exact publication day is supplied. Historical records and asymptotic championship claims are not imported as current facts. No full proof or software replication.